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Home My WebLink About02-11-2016 Potential Safety and Resource ConcernsFEDERAL WAY CITY COUNCIL SPECIAL MEETING PROPOSED PORT OF TACOMA METHANOL PLANT CD DIRECTOR MORALES REMARKS BACKGROUND PROCESS AND CITY ROLE EIS SCOPING PERIOD EIS CITY POSITION POINTS TO CONSIDER IN EIS SCOPE AND REPORT • PAST INDUSTRIAL IMPACTS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS • INTERNATIONAL SAFETY RECORDS OF PRINCIPALS • HEALTH RISKS - HUMAN HEALTH, AIR, WATER, SOIL, INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS • RISK FOR DISASTER DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION • DISASTER PLANNING AND POSTING OF SURETY BOND, ETC. TO COVER RECOVERY COST • PIPELINE SAFETY • NATURAL RESOURCES DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION o PLUMES o WATER TEMPERATURES o DREDGING IMPACTS o SHELLFISH o SALMON AND OTHER SPECIES o ODOR o WATER SUPPLY - DROUGHT AND SENIOR WATER RIGHTS /CAPACITY • COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS DURING CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. o ARE 200 JOBS WORTH THE AMOUNT OF LAND, SHORELINE AND COMMUNITY IMPACT? o HOW MANY JOBS DOES CHINA RETAIN? o WHAT IS THE NET ( + / -) JOBS WHEN CONSIDERING OTHER US INDUSTRIES IMPACTED? • TRAFFIC AND OTHER IMPACTS OF 1000 WORKERS DURING CONSTRUCTION • EXAMINATION OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES - o METHODS o GEOGRAPHY • ECONOMIC STABILITY • ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE o POOR COMMUNITIES o MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND OUTREACH DURING PROCESS o LANGUAGE o MITIGATION AND JOBS o ARBRITRARY DECISION MAKING AS IT RELATES TO NOTIFICATION o PIPELINE ROUTE Zone 1 presents the greatest hazards, where everyone would likely be killed by cryogenic temperatures, fire, explosion or asphyxiation. Zone 2 presents a 30- second second - degree bum hazard to unprotected skin from a pool fire due to a conflagrated release at the ship. Confined vapor explosions, fire and asphyxiation could occur if combustion did not occur concurrently with the LNG release. Zone 3 presents an explosion hazard from confined vapors, burn and fire hazard, and possibly an asphyxiation hazard. In addition, actual impacts would probably not be symmetrical and would not entirely fill the areas of each of the hazard zones. The LNG vapors would likely be driven by wind, so the impacts would occur in relation to the wind direction and topography. M r* + �., u r 3 X 9 2 2 iv 1111 4 z Nearly two years ago, an explosion and massive gas leak at a liquid natural gas (LNG) facility in Plymouth, Washington, thirty miles south of the Tri- Cities, injured five workers and forced hundreds of people to evacuate their homes. To this day, state and federal oversight agencies have not published the findings of their investigations into the accident, and the facts about what happened are almost completely unknown to the public. Sightline's research into the Plymouth LNG explosion reveals that the LNG industry is creating a false safety record, and current regulations allow the industry to do so. Though the accident released a dangerous LNG vapor cloud into residential areas, it didn't meet the definition of "a threat to public safety," and federal rules did not classify it as an LNG spill. Furthermore, facility owner Williams Pipeline Company (Williams) is still withholding key details about the accident. Incomplete accounting of accidents slows safety improvements in the LNG industry and conceals critical information that could help keep first responders safe. It also makes it very difficult for local governments and the public to make informed decisions about where to permit proposed LNG facilities. Oregon and Washington are considering three LNG terminal proposals, and the events at Plymouth should inform both states' analyses of those proposals. Plymouth is the largest LNG storage facility in the Pacific Northwest, boasting two 14.6 million gallon storage tanks. Shortly after 8:00 a.m. on March 31, 2014, gas processing equipment at Plymouth LNG exploded into a towering, mushroom- shaped cloud. Nearby residents saw flames shoot into the air, and people living three to six miles from the plant could feel the explosion. The blast sent 250 pounds of debris and shrapnel flying as far as 300 yards, damaging buildings and equipment and puncturing one of the large LNG storage tanks. Shrapnel injured four of the fourteen employees on duty, and a fifth worker was hospitalized for bums. Debris from the blast also damaged the main rail line on the north side of the Columbia River, which delayed more than 40 trains before BNSF Railway completed repairs on Tuesday afternoon. (Sightline has previously calculated that on a typical day, several notoriously combustible oil trains traverse the route that passes by the Plymouth LNG facility.) In the hours that followed, almost 600,000 gallons of LNG spewed from a large gash in the storage tank. Video and photos show vaporized LNG escaping from a puncture low on the tank. Williams says the damaged tank was only one -third full. Fumes from the facility sickened residents and emergency responders and endangered the public. The leak formed a dangerous cloud of gas vapors, which an east wind pushed toward the town of Plymouth. Vapor clouds become more dangerous as they drift away from the site of the leak and mix with oxygen: at a 5 to 15 percent concentration, a vapor cloud that meets a spark or flame can catch fire and burn all the way back to the source. To protect public safety, state officials evacuated Plymouth LNG employees as well as residents within two miles of the facility. They shut down traffic on the nearby Columbia River, parts of Highway 14, and the rail lines near the plant, which helped reduce ignition sources for the escaping gas. http : / /www.jamestownpress.com/news /2009 -08- 27/Letters to the Editor /Defining_LNG_hazards.html ?print =l http: / /www.quoddyloop.com/ingtss /standards.html Here is what they have to say about the three zones: Zone 1 presents the greatest hazards, where everyone would likely be killed by cryogenic temperatures, fire, explosion or asphyxiation. Zone 2 presents a 30- second second - degree burn hazard to unprotected skin from a pool fire due to a conflagrated release at the ship. Confined vapor explosions, fire and asphyxiation could occur if combustion did not occur concurrently with the LNG release. Zone 3 presents an explosion hazard from confined vapors, burn and fire hazard, and possibly an asphyxiation hazard. In addition, actual impacts would probably not be symmetrical and would not entirely fill the areas of each of the hazard zones. The LNG vapors would likely be driven by wind, so the impacts would occur in relation to the wind direction and topography. http://www.sightline.org/2016/02/08/how- industry- and - regulators- kept - public -in- the - dark -after- 2014 -1ng- explosion- in- washington/ http: / /www.theolympian.com/ news / local / politics- government/article59245213.html http: / /www.cnn.com/2015/ 10/08 /us/louisiana- deadly - gas- explosion/index.html http : / /atlantablackstar.com/2015 /01 /29/china-is-building-a- 1 -8 5b-methanol-plant-in-cancer- alley-lo uisiana-but-no-one-bothered-to-inform-its-predominantly-black-community/ If there ihttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/nyregion/cuomo- rejects- natural - gas -port- proposed- off - long - island.html? r=2s http: / /news.nationalpost.com /news /canada/explosion- massive - blaze- at- winnipeg- racing -fuel- warehouse- forces - dozens - from -homes https:// dogwoodinitiative.org/blog/want- free - trade - build -a- west - coast - pipeline- says -china